QUANTITIVE EASING BENEFITS THE SUPER RICH

QUANTITIVE EASING BENEFITS THE SUPER ELITE
http://kevingilmour.net/quantitative-easing-benefits-super-elite/2132

The Fed has just announced its fourth round of “quantitative easing”. While the mainstream financial press pretends that quantitative easing is a “liberal” economic policy, nothing could be further from the truth.

As we’ve repeatedly explained, quantitative easing is a bailout for the super-rich, at the expense of the little guy. It increases inequality and fails to stimulate the economy. (And it destroys the savings of retirees.)

Indeed, Fed boss Ben Bernanke knew 24 years ago that quantitative easing doesn’t help.

Forbes’ Lawrence Hunter explains:

The Federal Reserve … operates its own financial Laundromat for troubled, in some cases criminal banks. The Fed’s loan laundry and downscale resale consignment shop first takes in the wash by purchasing non-performing, and therefore largely worthless financial assets (loans and loan-backed securities) to remove them from the books of private banks. (Another variant is for the Fed to swap the banks’ bad paper at face value for federal debt instruments, which replaces the banks’ non-performing assets having little, if any, resale value, with safe, interest-paying and highly marketable assets.). The Fed then launders the loans by reselling them back to the same group of banks at a fraction (10 percent or less) of the face-value price it paid the banks for them. Once the banks repurchase the spiffed up dirty loan laundry, it not only has turned a nifty 90-percent-or-more profit on the turn around, it also has a new asset it can put back into the stream of financial commerce at a price reflective of its true value.

The Fed is a perfect vehicle to transform bad assets into good. It is weakly overseen without an independent audit and thus is able to intermediate the transformation of bad, illiquid assets into money (and near money) and then back again into valuable financial assets, all done secretly and anonymously. Unlike the polite, don’t-ask-don’t-tell fiction of private hedge-fund money laundering, however, the Fed says outright, “Don’t ask, because we aren’t telling,” even when target=”_blank”>asked again and target=”_blank”>again.

Immediately after the 2008 financial meltdown, the Fed laundered more than $2 trillion in worthless assets held on the balance sheets of private banks. According to a watered-down 2011 audit of the Fed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), there have been $16 trillion in Fed bailouts to banks and corporations around the world since the financial meltdown in 2008. Since that report, Bloomberg has reported on an additional $9 trillion in secret, off-balance-sheet Fed transactions that the central bank refuses to discuss. Now, Ben Bernanke is ginning up assembly-line washing machines at the Fed with QE∞ to spin an opened-ended, $40-billion-monthly cleansing campaign to purchase worthless mortgage backed securities from banks at face value, which could run to an additional $1.3 trillion loan laundering accompanied by downscale resales.

Indeed, the Fed:

Gave huge bailouts to foreign banks, including Gaddafi’s Libyan bank, the Arab Banking Corp. of Bahrain, and the Banks of Bavaria, Korea and Mexico;
Bailed out hedge funds, McDonald’s and Harley-Davidson
Threw money at “several billionaires and tens of multi-millionaires”, including Christy Mack, the wife of Morgan Stanley’s John Mack, billionaire businessman H. Wayne Huizenga, and Michael Dell, co-founder of Dell Computer, hedge fund manager John Paulson and private equity honcho J. Christopher Flowers
Hunter continues:

QE is no mere financial Laundromat; it is a full-service loan laundry and downscale resale facility that not only cleans the banks’ balance sheets but also sterilizes the entire operation to prevent it from producing immediate price inflation. It illustrates the way the Fed’s loan laundry and downscale resale facility works:

After the Fed buys (at face value) and resells (at pennies on the dollar) the bad mortgage-backed securities with newly minted electronic digits that it places into the banks’ Federal Reserve accounts, it then sterilizes the entire operation to prevent the new money from transmitting the dread inflation virus. The Fed does so by, in effect, quarantining inside the banking system the new toxic money used to launder the dirty loans. [I've explained the mechanism for the Fed's action before.] To affect this quarantine, the Fed wields both a carrot and a stick to keep this newly minted digital money from seeping out into the economy through new loans and igniting inflation: It pays the bank interest on its Fed reserves as long as the bank keeps the funds on deposit at the Fed (the carrot); and it tightens reserve requirements by raising the amount of money the bank must keep on deposit at the Federal Reserve (the stick).

There are much better ways to stimulate the economy, but the Fed is only interested in maintaining the status quo for its owners. And see this.


Recommended For You:
Quantitative easing and why it doesn’t work Bank of England refrains from more quantitative easing Quantitative Easing, Central Banks & Easy Money Bank of England decides not to extend quantitative easing Bank of England Considers More Quantitative Easing & Negative Interest Rates Bank of England Votes Against More Quantitative Easing

STRATEGIC QUANTITIVE EASING

http://www.neweconomics.org/publications...ive-easing


The Bank of England’s programmes of Quantitative Easing (QE) and Funding for Lending (FLS) are failing to stimulate GDP and rebalance the economy. Both policies falsely assume that the UK’s risk-averse capital markets, corporate sector and constrained banking system can be nudged into supporting the productive economy. We propose a new approach: one that channels investment directly into new housing, infrastructure and SME lending, boosting productivity and exports. QE must become less scattergun and more strategic, with reformed governance structures to match.

The impact of QE: theory and evidence

The way QE has been interpreted and applied in the UK has benefitted some parts of the economy at the expense of others. While it has assisted some borrowers (including the Government) who have enjoyed lower medium and long-term interest rates, it is bank credit for productive GDP transactions, not interest rates, that is the primary driver of nominal GDP. In other words, success in lowering interest rates does not necessarily translate into success in stimulating the real economy.

In theory, QE should induce investors to move money away from holding government debt and into the corporate sector, boosting investment, production and employment. But it is highly uncertain that this mechanism of ‘portfolio rebalancing’ works in reality. Instead – as evidenced by current volatility in stock, bond and currency markets – investors reacting to QE are likely to channel their money mainly into financial assets. This inflates the price of such assets, and enriches the assets’ owners, with minimal positive impact on the real economy.

If it is broke, don’t use it: FLS and the problem with trying to get banks to lend

Funding for Lending has stimulated bank credit for the real economy more directly than QE. But in practice this credit has mainly been in the form of mortgage debt rather than corporate lending, and has been severely constrained by the continued weaknesses of bank balance sheets.

Even if bank lending does increase, we cannot be sure that it will lead to output, investment and employment rather than a new house price, commodities or stock market boom. Chronic structural weaknesses and perverse regulatory incentives mean that, without further policies, reliance on the UK banking system is not an effective channel for stimulating or rebalancing the economy.

Strategic QE: public money for public benefit

It is time to seriously consider more strategic use of the Bank of England’s powers as a bank.

An estimated £550bn of investment in new low-carbon infrastructure is required over the next 10 years in the UK, and housing construction remains at its lowest level in the post-war period. We therefore propose that the Asset Purchase Facility buys bonds issued by agencies with a specific remit for productive investment within the UK, such as in housing-building and retrofit, infrastructure and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Both government and opposition parties now support the economic case for a national development bank. However – as is the case with our Green Investment Bank – lack of a banking license and the Government’s reluctance to commit taxpayer funds will severely limit the British Business Bank’s scale and impact.

Total capital for both these institutions of less than £4 billion compares with balance sheets of over £200bn for the Brazilian development bank and £400bn for Germany’s KfW.

Central bank support for national infrastructure investment has worked before. The Industrial Development Bank of Canada, which supported Canadian SMEs from 1946-1972, was capitalised entirely by the Central Bank with not a single penny of taxpayers’ money required. In New Zealand in 1936, the central bank extended credit for the building of new homes, helping the country out of the Great Depression. Moreover, the majority of the UK’s major international competitors, including emerging market economies, have public investment banks or equivalent funds supporting infrastructure or SME financing.

We also examine the case for the APF purchasing a wider range of assets from banks in order to free up their capital for more productive lending. This has been successful in the USA and might improve the impact of QE here, but overall we recommend strategic QE as the best approach to rebalancing the UK economy.

Getting the governance right: the fiscal/monetary policy mix

Would strategic QE blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy? In reality the distinction has always been blurred. We should now be asking what governance systems could allow us to carry out hybrid monetary/fiscal measures, and then selecting the most effective tools to deploy.

We suggest the formation of a Monetary Allocation Committee that would be accountable to the Treasury and Parliament but separate from the Bank of England’s existing Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The new committee would decide how best to allocate new QE funding and any reinvestment of maturing gilts (almost £100bn are being repaid over the next five years).

The committee would be charged with carefully examining different sectors of the economy and spare capacity within them. It would make allocation judgements based on a broad range of macroeconomic and policy criteria, such as sustainable GDP growth, employment, financial stability, the trade balance and inflation and ecological sustainability. Meanwhile, the independent MPC would remain in charge of determining the quantity of Bank of England reserves created and remain accountable for inflation. This would maintain an appropriate separation of powers and ensure that inflation expectations remained anchored.

We have already entered the world of monetary policy activism; let’s make it as effective, transparent and accountable as possible.

STRATEGIC QUANTITIVE EASING

http://www.neweconomics.org/publications...ive-easing


The Bank of England’s programmes of Quantitative Easing (QE) and Funding for Lending (FLS) are failing to stimulate GDP and rebalance the economy. Both policies falsely assume that the UK’s risk-averse capital markets, corporate sector and constrained banking system can be nudged into supporting the productive economy. We propose a new approach: one that channels investment directly into new housing, infrastructure and SME lending, boosting productivity and exports. QE must become less scattergun and more strategic, with reformed governance structures to match.

The impact of QE: theory and evidence

The way QE has been interpreted and applied in the UK has benefitted some parts of the economy at the expense of others. While it has assisted some borrowers (including the Government) who have enjoyed lower medium and long-term interest rates, it is bank credit for productive GDP transactions, not interest rates, that is the primary driver of nominal GDP. In other words, success in lowering interest rates does not necessarily translate into success in stimulating the real economy.

In theory, QE should induce investors to move money away from holding government debt and into the corporate sector, boosting investment, production and employment. But it is highly uncertain that this mechanism of ‘portfolio rebalancing’ works in reality. Instead – as evidenced by current volatility in stock, bond and currency markets – investors reacting to QE are likely to channel their money mainly into financial assets. This inflates the price of such assets, and enriches the assets’ owners, with minimal positive impact on the real economy.

If it is broke, don’t use it: FLS and the problem with trying to get banks to lend

Funding for Lending has stimulated bank credit for the real economy more directly than QE. But in practice this credit has mainly been in the form of mortgage debt rather than corporate lending, and has been severely constrained by the continued weaknesses of bank balance sheets.

Even if bank lending does increase, we cannot be sure that it will lead to output, investment and employment rather than a new house price, commodities or stock market boom. Chronic structural weaknesses and perverse regulatory incentives mean that, without further policies, reliance on the UK banking system is not an effective channel for stimulating or rebalancing the economy.

Strategic QE: public money for public benefit

It is time to seriously consider more strategic use of the Bank of England’s powers as a bank.

An estimated £550bn of investment in new low-carbon infrastructure is required over the next 10 years in the UK, and housing construction remains at its lowest level in the post-war period. We therefore propose that the Asset Purchase Facility buys bonds issued by agencies with a specific remit for productive investment within the UK, such as in housing-building and retrofit, infrastructure and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Both government and opposition parties now support the economic case for a national development bank. However – as is the case with our Green Investment Bank – lack of a banking license and the Government’s reluctance to commit taxpayer funds will severely limit the British Business Bank’s scale and impact.

Total capital for both these institutions of less than £4 billion compares with balance sheets of over £200bn for the Brazilian development bank and £400bn for Germany’s KfW.

Central bank support for national infrastructure investment has worked before. The Industrial Development Bank of Canada, which supported Canadian SMEs from 1946-1972, was capitalised entirely by the Central Bank with not a single penny of taxpayers’ money required. In New Zealand in 1936, the central bank extended credit for the building of new homes, helping the country out of the Great Depression. Moreover, the majority of the UK’s major international competitors, including emerging market economies, have public investment banks or equivalent funds supporting infrastructure or SME financing.

We also examine the case for the APF purchasing a wider range of assets from banks in order to free up their capital for more productive lending. This has been successful in the USA and might improve the impact of QE here, but overall we recommend strategic QE as the best approach to rebalancing the UK economy.

Getting the governance right: the fiscal/monetary policy mix

Would strategic QE blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy? In reality the distinction has always been blurred. We should now be asking what governance systems could allow us to carry out hybrid monetary/fiscal measures, and then selecting the most effective tools to deploy.

We suggest the formation of a Monetary Allocation Committee that would be accountable to the Treasury and Parliament but separate from the Bank of England’s existing Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The new committee would decide how best to allocate new QE funding and any reinvestment of maturing gilts (almost £100bn are being repaid over the next five years).

The committee would be charged with carefully examining different sectors of the economy and spare capacity within them. It would make allocation judgements based on a broad range of macroeconomic and policy criteria, such as sustainable GDP growth, employment, financial stability, the trade balance and inflation and ecological sustainability. Meanwhile, the independent MPC would remain in charge of determining the quantity of Bank of England reserves created and remain accountable for inflation. This would maintain an appropriate separation of powers and ensure that inflation expectations remained anchored.

We have already entered the world of monetary policy activism; let’s make it as effective, transparent and accountable as possible.



USING QE TO REBUILD THE UK ECONOMY - THE CANADIAN WAY
http://www.neweconomics.org/blog/entry/u...nadian-way

Dear Governor Carney,

QE is being written about in the media as your great challenge. If you want more of it, as your predecessor did, how do you counter the argument that it is a policy with diminishing returns, just as likely to pump up house prices or financial assets as it is to trickle through to the real economy? If you want less, how do you unwind QE without creating turmoil in the financial markets, as has been the result of the recent announcements of the Federal Reserve?

We suggest a third, ‘Canadian way’.

In 1944, The Canadian government and recently formed Central Bank faced an enormous reconstruction challenge. One of the solutions was to create a new public bank – the Canadian Industrial Development Bank (IDB) – to support an SME sector desperate for funding with WWII having just ended.

Where was the money to come from given sky-high public deficit? The answer was simple: the Central Bank used its power of money creation to capitalise the IDB which would then lend to SMEs as needed. From 1944-1972, the IDB authorised 65,000 loans totalling $3 billion for 48,000 businesses, employing almost a million people. Not a single penny of taxpayers’ money was needed.

Today we’ve released a new report, arguing that the Canadian example should be adopted and taken further. Instead of buying government bonds and relying on financial markets and our sickly banking sector, the Bank should use its power of money creation to buy assets in intermediaries with a remit to invest in the real economy: bonds in the Green Investment Bank and British Business Bank, financing the Green Deal or capitalising a Public Interest Company to build much needed affordable and social housing.

Even with no additional QE purchases, a total of £100bn of QE purchased government bonds will come up for renewal in the next 5 years, equivalent to the government’s entire capital spending plans over the same period, announced last week by Danny Alexander.

How to achieve this whilst maintaining the Bank’s independence on monetary policy? Create a new body – the Monetary Allocation Committee (MAC) – that would be in charge of deciding how best to distribute Bank of England QE money. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) would remain in charge of the quantity of Central Bank money created, retaining its primary inflation remit. The MAC would staffed by independent experts but accountable to the Treasury and Parliament rather than the Bank, given its more fiscal remit.

The fact is that the Bank of England, through schemes like Funding for Lending and the Financial Policy Committee is already blurring the line between monetary and fiscal policy. Our proposal makes the division transparent and democratically accountable.

The result would be win-win-win: create sustainable growth and jobs, boost productivity and boost exports, all without increasing the public debt. What’s not to like?